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The courts. Just like getting a warrant for anything else. The authorities would have to prove "just cause" to obtain a warrant.
If your spouse, child or parent were being held hostage and the authorities got the phone of one of the abductors, and it was hoped that information in the phone might help lead to their recovery, wouldn't it be worth it?
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Just cause is a very broad term.
I was pulled over in Texas and they searched me and the vehicle that I was driving because the officer said that my Garmin was obstructing my view. It was on the windshield under the rear view mirror just like thousands of other people. He stopped me because I had long hair and he just knew I was transporting drugs.
In other words just cause is a fabrication, it can be anything.
New version: WinHeist Version 2.2.2 Beta tomorrow (noun): a mystical land where 99% of all human productivity, motivation and achievement is stored.
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NOT so -- in the case of getting a warrant or court order. The authorities have to PROVE that just cause exists to a judge. In your case (which I'm sure happens a lot more than we realize), the officer "bluffed" just cause which may or may not have held up in court after the fact if the stop had been challenged. To get a warrant or court order - they start off in court proving their case
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the good of the many outweighs the good of the one
well the world does not work this way (or neither of us would sit in front of a computer and talk about this) - remember: we (as in the west) are not the many when you see it globally
And the context here really matters: it's not for the good of anyone if Apple give in - the bad will just go and use some other - more secure - means of communication, while we all would lose even more of our privacy.
“If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy.”
(Philip Zimmermann)
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GStrad wrote: once they open pandora's box they can't close it
Yes they can. Lots and lots of legal decisions - both good and bad - get overturned every day.
cheers
Chris Maunder
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legal precedents are harder to over turn than they are to not create in the first place and I was lso thinking of this:
Quote: "asked us to build a backdoor to the iPhone" — something he described as "too dangerous to create."
pandora's box, that would be exploited by criminals and legally allowed representatives alike. Really bad idea!
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GStrad wrote: asked us to build a backdoor to the iPhone
Ah, yes. That's certainly a nasty box. I was thinking purely of the legal rights.
cheers
Chris Maunder
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But why go to Apple? Just hire 2-3 really good phone hackers and they'll get in within a week.
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I'm pretty sure that would be illegal and any evidence uncovered would be inadmissible in any U.S. court. Law enforcement wouldn't be use any incriminating evidence, if found, to levy charges against any other accomplices.
if (Object.DividedByZero == true) { Universe.Implode(); }
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If Mr. Cook chooses to ignore a court order, then Mr. Cook should be held in contempt of court.
Isn't this what would happen to the rest of us?
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Of course it would. I can't see any good reason why Apple can't unlock this one phone.
If it's not broken, fix it until it is
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I don't think he's simply going to "ignore" the ruling, they're going to appeal the decision. I'm sure Apple has an army of lawyers.
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at first i as reading this as Mr. Crook, not Cook.
Yeah Mr. Crook is ignoring court order.
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Ben Franklin: Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
'nuff said.
There are two types of people in this world: those that pronounce GIF with a soft G, and those who do not deserve to speak words, ever.
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He said that right before he discovered electricity and changed the world.
If it's not broken, fix it until it is
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There are two types of people in this world: those that pronounce GIF with a soft G, and those who do not deserve to speak words, ever.
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We're supposed to be the home of the brave, not the home of the pansies. +5 million
Jeremy Falcon
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Yup. I read a book about 1984... things were really screwed up back then. Hope it doesn't happen again.
Mark
Just another cog in the wheel
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I see a couple of problems with your argument:
1. Apple at the moment can claim that an attempt to unlock the phone constitutes an "undue burden" - cracking the encryption on the account is presumably non-trivial. Once it has been done, however, the FBI has both precedent and the existence of the cracking tool on its side. How long do you think it will be before they persuade judges to give them court orders for all (not just terrorist) cases?
2. Once the unlocking tool has been developed, do you really believe it will remain only in the hands of the "Good Guys"? I would not bet anything I care to lose that the tool won't be in the hands of the criminal fraternity by the end of the month. Given that Apple's encryption protects sensitive financial data, among other things, the consequences are not good.
I agree that a good look at the terrorist's phone might provide important clues, but some benefits are not worth the future cost.
If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it again. Then hit it a third time - a tremendous whack.
--Winston Churchill
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If such a tool existed - and I was a Serious Criminal - I'd be prepared to spend BIG money in terms of bribes to the appropriate Apple employee(s) to get a copy of the source.
How many people here would turn down - say - ten years salary in a Swiss bank account? The criminals could get that back in a day...
Bad command or file name. Bad, bad command! Sit! Stay! Staaaay...
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Having been a developer for 30+ years, I can't sit here and believe that Apple doesn't already have a way to open a phone.
Have you ever written encryption without a way to unlock it? How would you test it without an unlocking mechanism?
It already exists - Apple just doesn't want to give it up.
If it's not broken, fix it until it is
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A good encryption system is one that will not allow an attacker to decrypt a ciphertext even if he (a) knows the encryption/decryption algorithms and (b) has both plaintext and ciphertext of a set of messages encrypted with the key. If the key used has enough bits, the only way to crack the encryption is to attack the algorithm.
Once the algorithm is known to be sound, you test an encryption system by generating keys (or key pairs). You do not encrypt (and destroy the plaintext) of any important data.
No one can prove that many popular algorithms do not have built-in "back doors" (rumors about the NSA's work are legion), but if so - no one is talking...
If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it again. Then hit it a third time - a tremendous whack.
--Winston Churchill
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Daniel Pfeffer wrote: No one can prove that many popular algorithms do not have built-in "back doors"
Most widely used algorithms have open-source implementations, meaning you can look at the source and see if you see any deficiencies or back doors. So... the algorithms themselves are pretty sound.
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Very few people have the background in cryptography required to analyze an encryption algorithm. An algorithm with a vulnerability could be perfectly encoded, but still be vulnerable to attack.
If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it again. Then hit it a third time - a tremendous whack.
--Winston Churchill
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"Very few" is different than "no one", I believe you used the latter.
Daniel Pfeffer wrote: An algorithm with a vulnerability could be perfectly encoded, but still be vulnerable to attack.
Sure, that is true of anything in this world, but that's the rationale for open sourcing projects... To allow other people other than the original designers to assess vulnerabilities.
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